In fractional ownership markets, consumers purchase a share in a property and can later exchange it with other owners through a secondary market. Forward-looking consumers may purchase low quality shares at a low price with the intention of trading up. This poses a serious problem. We show that firms can adopt a tiered approach for exchange so as to restore sales of high quality shares in the primary market, while at the same time facilitating exchanges in the secondary market. Data from laboratory markets strongly support this argument. Firm revenue and total social surplus are both higher in tiered than in tier-free markets. Furthermore, the impact of the tier structure depends on the exchange mechanism the firm uses. Over time, participants adapt to changes in tier structure in the direction predicted by theory. Risk aversion partly explains the deviation of data from theoretical predictions.
INTRODUCTION
In fractional ownership markets, a consumer purchases a share of a property which allows the owner to use the property for a specified period of time every year for the duration of the ownership. For example, a family can purchase week 47 (Thanksgiving week) of a two-bedroom house in Orlando. The family is then entitled to a week-long stay at the property every year in that specific week. This is different from the concept of rental (e.g., Purohit 1997, Lehman and Weinberg 2000) because the legal ownership of a property entitles the owner to participate in secondary markets to make exchanges or to resell. Fractional ownership is best known in the tourism and resort real estate industries under the term timeshare. Timesharing is available globally, particularly in North America, Europe, and Latin America (Pryce 2002) . According to the American Resort Development Association, the timeshare industry has expanded at an average annual rate of 14.7% in the past decade, reaching $10.6 billion in primary sales in 2007. In the U.S., the practice of fractional ownership has also become increasingly popular in other luxury goods market, including private jets, yachts, and luxury vehicles. The purchase of fractional properties entails commitment to future consumption, which naturally involves uncertainty. Similar to any other advance selling arrangement (Xie and Shugan 2001) , the separation of purchase and consumption creates uncertainty regarding utility from consumption.
Unforeseen situations caused by personal issues or work schedule may render the original vacation plan unfeasible. As a result, for this year's vacation the family that bought week 47 in Orlando in the earlier example may prefer week 51 (Christmas week) to the week they own. Family members may also experience a change in preference such that other property locations become more appealing. If members of the family have recently developed a new interest in skiing, then for this family a ski resort property in Vail, Colorado might become more desirable than the one they own in Orlando.
This family, like millions of other fractional owners, can then resort to a secondary exchange market for the much-needed flexibility in consumption. These are one-time exchanges of usage right that do not involve modification of property entitlement. To facilitate exchange, firms typically set up a pool of inventory so that owners can withdraw properties from this pool, and, in return, deposit their own properties back into the pool. Consumers who participate in the exchange market are no longer bound to the property they own. Instead, they can take vacations in different locations and at a time that fits their busy schedule. Similarly, the fractional owners of a private jet can potentially get access to an entire fleet of aircrafts. It is not surprising that such secondary markets have become ubiquitous in the fractional ownership industry. For example, Ragatz Associates (an independent market research firm in the resort real estate industry) reports that about 66% of fractional homes are in an exchange program.
Our research is motivated by the unique features of consumer fractional ownership markets. In particular, market makers (i.e., firms) need to not only encourage purchases in the primary market, but also facilitate exchanges in the secondary market. Furthermore, as consumers are forward-looking, the design of the secondary exchange market can have a profound impact on primary sales. Extant research has focused on either primary sales that involve advance selling Xie 2000, Xie and Shugan 2001) , or the secondary exchange markets alone Sönmez 2002, Wang and Krishna 2006) . While these studies uncover important insights pertinent to the fractional ownership industry, they are silent on how to design the exchange market -taking into consideration the impact of exchanges on primary sales. We hope to fill this gap in the literature.
We study two key aspects of market design in the secondary market: the exchange mechanism and the tier structure. As we show in this paper, both aspects of the design have significant implications for consumers' choice of strategy and firm profitability. An exchange mechanism defines the sequence of deposits and withdrawals, which often takes one of two forms -Request First and Deposit First. Under the Request First mechanism, owners turn in the usage right of their own property only after they have obtained a preferred property from the market maker. In contrast, Deposit First mechanism requires owners to give up their own properties by making binding deposits prior to a search for potential withdrawals. The market maker also needs to make a critical decision on the tier structure. Some firms (e.g., Timbers Resorts) permit all owners to make exchanges within the firm's entire network, whereas other firms (e.g., Netjets, Resort Condominiums International) classify properties into tiers, allowing owners to exchange only within their own tier or restricting trading up. We refer to the former approach as a "tier-free structure", and the latter as a "tiered structure".
To investigate the implications of various market designs, we propose a theoretical model that explicitly captures the critical features of fractional ownership markets. We consider forward-looking consumers who fall into two segments that differ on price sensitivity. Our theoretical analysis reveals that, regardless of the exchange mechanism, in a tier-free market consumers are likely to purchase lower quality properties in the primary market and then exchange them for higher quality ones in the secondary market. This is a highly undesirable outcome for the market maker. By restricting upgrades using a tiered structure, the market maker can improve profitability because different types of consumers are effectively separated, each segment purchasing the properties meant for it. Although the benefit of the tiered structure comes at the cost of a slightly smaller number of exchanges, the exchange market can still function smoothly for both consumer segments. In order to empirically test our theory about tier structure and to compare the benefit of adding tiers across the two most widely adopted exchange mechanismsRequest First versus Deposit First, we set up experimental markets with incentivized human subjects in a laboratory setting. We find strong evidence that firm profit is higher in tiered markets than in tier-free markets. Interestingly, experimental results also reveal that the benefit of the tiered structure is much higher under the Request First mechanism than under the Deposit First mechanism. This is because, as compared to a tier-free Deposit First market, a tier-free Request First market entices more participants to "game" the system by purchasing lower quality properties and then trading up. Hence, empirical evidence shows that the choice of exchange mechanism is especially important when the market has a tier-free structure. Taken together, our results suggest that for fractional ownership programs it is crucial to consider the impact of market design choices on both primary sales and secondary exchanges.
EXISTING LITERATURE
Our research is related to several streams of literature. The first literature is on state-dependent utility theory, which focuses on situations where the buyers' utility from consumption depends on future circumstances (Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990 , Shugan and Xie 2000 , Xie and Shugan 2001 . Xie and Shugan (2001) and Shugan and Xie (2005) point out that the utility from consumption can vary with consumers' moods, health, opportunities, conflicts, work schedule, family situations, and so forth. Hence, at the time of purchase, there is uncertainty regarding the utility of future consumption. Following this literature, we model the impact of future circumstances on fractional owners' consumption utility via the density function of possible owner valuations. It is important to note that, when this uncertainty is resolved as owners obtain more information about their state of consumption, they are given the opportunity to participate in an exchange market to improve their final payoff.
2 Extant research has mainly focused on the implications of state-dependent utility on the primary market, whereas our paper considers both the primary market and the secondary market from a market maker's perspective.
In nature, the secondary exchange market we study is a special case of one-sided matching markets, where limited resources (e.g., properties) are allocated to individuals. For example, researchers have studied the allocation of houses to tenants (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez 1999 , Carrillo and Singhal 2011 , the assignment of courses to students through bidding Ünver 2008, Sönmez and Ünver 2010) , and the kidney exchange programs where kidneys are matched to patients (Roth, Sönmez and Ünver 2004 , Zhang 2010 ). Most of the matching literature concerns the efficiency of the matching markets, taking initial ownership as exogenously given.
Our research contributes to this literature by introducing a tiered structure into matching while endogenizing the ownership decision. We show that the design of the matching market is critical when the initial ownership is endogenous to the matching problem.
There is limited research on the new business paradigm of fractional ownership or its affiliated exchange markets. From the operations perspective, researchers have explored solutions for effective scheduling in a fractional jet program (Yang et al. 2008 ) and a vacation timesharing program (Sampson 2008 ). Wang and Krishna (2006) identify the deficiencies of the Request First and the Deposit First mechanisms, and proposed a new mechanism -TTCCS -to improve the efficiency of the secondary market. In the present work, the secondary market is structured much like Wang and Krishna (2006) , but in addition we investigate the use of tier structure and its impact on the primary sales market. We focus on the Deposit First and the Request First mechanisms as these two are widely used in fractional ownership markets, whereas TTCCS has not been widely adopted.
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Our setting involves agents' decisions on whether or not to enter the secondary market. In that way our work ties directly into the market entry literature. In the experimental investigation on market entry, Rapoport, Lo and Zwick (2002) and Zwick and Rapoport (2002) study situations where each agent must choose which market to participate in, and the probability of winning a prize in each market decreases as the number of agents choosing that market increases. Our setting is more complex in that the probability of an owner winning a better property is affected by the number of owners who choose to enter the market, the quality of the properties they own, and the design of the market (i.e., the tier structure and the exchange mechanism the market maker uses). Our theory says that a consumer's strategic decisions are endogenously determined by the design of the market. Incentivized laboratory experiments allow us to empirically test the theory and, furthermore, to measure the benefit of adding tiers under the Request First versus the Deposit First exchange mechanisms. Thus, our paper represents another promising endeavor to experimentally explore consumer strategic decision making and the market outcomes under various market designs (Amaldoss and He 2009 , Amaldoss et al. 2008 , Amaldoss and Rapoport 2005 , Chen and Sönmez 2006 , Ho, Lim and Camerer 2006 , Krishna and Ünver 2008 , Lim 2010 , Srivastava, Chakravarti and Rapoport 2000 , Tucker and Zhang, 2010 , Viswanathan et al. 2009 , Wang and Krishna 2006 , Zwick et al. 2003 .
MODEL
We use the timeshare industry as a running example to investigate the implications of tier structures and exchange mechanisms. Here households purchase timeshare properties and then have the option to exchange the usage right of their properties in a secondary market. The firm is a market maker that designs and establishes the platform for property owners to make exchanges. The market maker's depository of timeshare properties is known as space bank. Property owners can deposit their property into the space bank and withdraw a different property from it. Thus, the space bank serves the important purpose of facilitating exchanges among the owners.
We investigate two exchange mechanisms that are widely adopted in the industry -the Deposit First (DF) mechanism and the Request First (RF) mechanism. The DF mechanism requires a binding deposit before a search for potential withdrawal. This suggests an owner might end up with a less desirable property than the one he deposited. The RF mechanism allows owners to withdraw a more desirable property before depositing their own. Hence, there is no risk of trading downward under RF. In other words, unlike DF, RF is an incentive compatible mechanism. 4 We view the problem from the perspective the market maker. In our model, properties fall into two discrete types -low quality and high quality, denoted Q L and Q H , such that Q H > Q L > 0. There is no uncertainty regarding property quality. For any property, the quality is objectively determined and observed by all agents in the market. Prices are exogenously given 5 based on property quality, at P L (for low quality properties) and P H (for high quality properties), such that .
Price information is common knowledge in the market.
There are N risk neutral households, each with one unit of demand. Households seek to buy and then potentially exchange properties. A household belongs to one of two types -the "Premium" A Premium household h values a property j at P hj j s Q + ; hence when it consumes the property it purchased, the net utility is θ
and when it consumes the property it purchased, the net utility is θ
). In these equations 0 > > θ θ , as the Premium households are less price sensitive than the Value households.
In our setting, when households make purchase decisions, they only observe the deterministic elements of their utility -the quality and prices of the properties and their own price sensitivity. 
IC/IR Conditions with No Prospect of Exchanges
The model is set up such that in the absence of a secondary exchange market, the Premium households prefer to purchase high quality properties (Q H ) and the Value households prefer to purchase low quality properties (Q L ). This is necessary for the two property levels to co-exist in the primary market. Therefore, the prices in the primary market should support the Incentive Compatibility (IC) and Individual Rationality (IR) conditions for both market segments.
For the Premium households, incentive compatibility (IC) in the primary market requires that the net utility from purchasing a high quality property is greater than the net utility from purchasing a low quality property. Formally, we express the IC constraint for the Premium households as follows.
Individual Rationality (IR) requires that for a Premium household the expected net utility from purchasing high quality property is non-negative. The Premium households IR constraint is:
Similarly, for the Value households, the IC and IR constraints are:
We assume conditions (1) - (4) to hold throughout the paper. As the two types of households separate in the primary market, the market maker's profit is
Note that these are necessary but not sufficient conditions for both the primary and the exchange market to operate smoothly.
IC/IR Conditions with Exchanges
When a secondary exchange market is introduced, it can potentially have an adverse impact on the primary sales market. We define "gaming the system" as purchasing low quality properties with an intention to trade up through the secondary market. In §3.4 we show that the existence of a tier-free exchange market can trigger the Premium households to game the system. If this happens, profit of the market maker becomes
The latter is a larger number and therefore strictly preferred by the market maker.
Households consider the following four combinations of strategies:
Strategies Description
Strategy A Buy high quality property (Q H ) and stay out of the exchange market Strategy B Buy high quality property (Q H ) and enter the exchange market Strategy C Buy low quality property (Q L ) and stay out of the exchange market Strategy D Buy low quality property (Q L ) and enter the exchange market - Table 2 : Household Strategies - properties in the space bank ( H n high quality properties and L n low quality ones), the number of households that purchase high quality properties ( H χ ), and the number of households that purchase low quality properties ( L χ ). It also depends on one's own strategy ( ξ , j ) and the actions taken by other people. For exposition purposes, we leave others' actions out of function G. However, we will be precise about others' actions when computing the expected valuation G in our derivation.
We can now characterize market equilibrium conditions using the four conditions below. For the Premium households:
The notations and denote the optimal strategies for a Premium household to adopt in stage 3 given its purchase decision in stage 2. Equation (5) guarantees that Premium households prefer purchasing Q H to not making a purchase. When equation (6) holds, Premium households prefer to purchase Q H over Q L in stage 2. Recall that the market maker would want Premium households to purchase Q H , and it would also want to encourage exchanges among these households. In other words, the market maker would prefer equations (5) and (6) to hold simultaneously, and it wants the Premium households to choose 1 = ξ after purchasing Q H .
For the Value households:
IC:
Equation (7) suggests that the Value households prefer purchasing Q L to not purchasing any property.
They prefer purchasing Q L to Q H when condition (8) holds.
In what follows, we work with the IR and IC conditions of equations (5) - (8) to analyze markets that provide exchange opportunities to households.
Interpretation of the Household Strategies under RF and DF

Request First
Under the RF mechanism, "entering exchange" is interpreted as "inspecting the space bank for a potential withdrawal." For tractability, we assume that each household is allowed to check the space bank once, at which point a withdrawal request can be made. All households in a tier-free exchange market (or in the same tier in a tiered structure) are treated equally, such that they have equal likelihood of being the n th household to access the space bank. At its turn, a household makes a withdrawal request if it finds a property that is preferred to its own. Once the withdrawal request is fulfilled, the household's original property is immediately released into the space bank for future withdrawal by others. If a household does not see anything attractive in the space bank, it keeps its original property. In either situation, the household exits the market after this step.
As RF is incentive compatible (with no risk of downgrading), strategy B (buy Q H and enter the 
Deposit First
We assume that in DF, all households make their one-time entry decision before any withdrawal occurs. Conditional on a deposit, a household may search the space bank for a withdrawal. Withdrawal is sequential. All households in a tier-free exchange market (or in the same tier in a tiered structure) have the same probability of being the n th household to request a withdrawal. A household in the DF market either makes no exchange (if it chooses not to deposit), or makes a single exchange (if it enters the exchange market by depositing its own property). Under DF, strategies A and C of Table 2 involve property owners electing to stay out of the exchange no matter how undesirable s hj turns out to be for their own property. Strategies B and D of Table 2 involve a conditional entry into the exchange market.
Those who use strategies B and D compare the expected value from the exchange market with the realized value of their own property, and enter the exchange if the former value is higher. Thus, under DF, strategies B and D are interpreted as households having a positive probability of entering the exchange.
Equilibrium Derivation
We investigate how exchange opportunities influence households' decisions and the subsequent equilibrium market outcomes. For both RF and DF, we show that in the absence of tiers, an initial depository of high quality properties in the space bank gives an incentive to households to game the system, thus causing the primary market to collapse. A tiered structure can help maintain the primary sales while encouraging entry into the exchange market, thus preserving both markets. For every proposition we also provide a theoretical prediction on the expected number of exchanges.
Request First
I. Tier-Free RF In a tier-free RF exchange market, all households are treated equally irrespective of what they own. Fixing the initial number of low quality properties in the space bank ( 0 > L n ), we consider the market maker's decision on H n , the initial number of high quality properties it places in the space bank.
Under one extreme scenario, the market maker initially provides no high quality property in the
This eliminates the possibility of gaming behavior. However, this approach also makes it impossible for owners of high quality properties to make any exchange under RF. In other words, this is a situation where the primary market may function well, but the exchange market does not. Therefore, setting 0 = H n is not a feasible approach.
We next consider the case where N n H < < 0 , 7 such that there is a positive probability for households with low quality property to trade up to a high quality property. In this situation, a pooling 7 When N n H ≥ , there are enough high quality properties in the space bank for all households to withdraw. So they should all buy the low quality properties (at a lower price) and then trade up. We do not consider this trivial case. equilibrium is likely to emerge, where both types of households purchase the low quality property knowing that they are likely to obtain a high quality property in the subsequent exchange market. We formally present the sufficient condition and the pooling equilibrium in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1
In a tier-free RF market, when 
All detailed proofs are available in Appendix A. is large), then the Premium households would also purchase Q L , causing the firm profitability to plummet in the primary market.
II. Tiered RF For a tiered RF exchange market, as no upgrading from Q L to Q H is allowed and no owners of high quality properties would willingly downgrade, the high versus low quality exchange tiers can be seen as two simultaneous but strictly separate exchange markets. For the low quality tier we define
as the expected improvement in value that exchange brings to the owners of low quality properties:
This parameter represents the expected added value from exchange for low quality property owners, and measures the difference between the expected payoff of strategy D (purchasing Q L and entering the exchange market) and that of strategy C (purchasing L Q and staying out 
ensures that the potential value from exchanging Q H in the high quality tier is not sufficient to entice the Value households to purchase a high quality property. Note that this is not a necessary condition since for Value households the IC constraint is not binding. Therefore, even when this condition is unmet, Value households may still prefer to purchase Q L .
is important as it guarantees that the Premium households do not find the low quality segment more attractive. Intuitively, σ captures the extent to which Premium households prefer Q H over Q L without considering the added value from the exchange market. When the added value from the low quality tier of the exchange market is not much higher than that of the high quality tier, this preference should not reverse and the two types of households would separate.
Deposit First
Under the DF mechanism, a household enters the exchange market when the expected value from exchange is higher than the realized value of its own property. This suggests that consumers' optimal strategy in stage 3 is characterized by cutoff points. Let Here we again focus our analysis on the scenario where the market maker initially provides some high quality properties in the space bank ( N n H < < 0 ). In this situation a pooling equilibrium where all households purchase Q L is likely to emerge. Proposition 3 below formally presents this equilibrium.
Proposition 3
In a tier-free DF exchange market, when For the Premium households, this decision is less straightforward and crucially depends on the price difference and quality difference for the two types of properties. A Premium household that buys Q H will not enter the exchange market due to the high chance of losing the original high quality property in the exchange. Also, a premium household that buys Q L will enter the exchange market now matter how much it values its own property -otherwise buying Q H is better. Thus, the Premium household has to decide between buying Q H at a higher price and keeping it, versus buying Q L at a lower price in the hope of exchanging it for Q H from the exchange market. When the probability of upgrading is sufficiently high and the price difference is sufficiently large (i.e., θ
, which can be rewritten as
), the Premium household opts for the latter, causing the primary market to collapse. Define in the low quality tier
in tiered RF, representing the expected added value from exchange for owners of L Q , when there are L n low quality properties in the space bank and L χ owners of low quality properties in the market. Similarly, for the high quality tier, define
and captures the added value from exchange for owners of high quality properties, when there are H n high quality properties in the space bank and H χ owners of high quality properties.
To quantify the additional value households obtain from exchange (α ), one needs to calculate the cutoff points
. This is not trivial, but we are able to characterize them in Appendix A. In the main text we take the cutoff points as given when showing our major results.
Define the probability of entering the low (high) quality tier of the exchange market as
In the low quality tier, households that enter the exchange have an property and stay out of the exchange market. So the equations below characterize
Similarly, in the high quality tier we have:
Proposition 4 describes a separating equilibrium in the tiered DF market.
Proposition 4
In a tiered DF exchange market, there exists a separating equilibrium where the Value households purchase low quality properties and enter the exchange market in the low quality tier, and the Premium households purchase high quality properties and enter the exchange market in the high quality tier. This equilibrium exists when
, and ) ( The proofs of Proposition 4 are in Appendix A and follow the same logic as that of Proposition 2.
implies that the value from purchasing Q H and entering high quality exchange tier is not big enough to justify the higher price for Q H . Therefore Value households prefer to purchase Q L and participate in exchange in the low quality tier. ) (
suggests that the added value from the low quality exchange tier is not big enough to entice Premium households to purchase Q L . Thus, when both conditions are met, there is a separating equilibrium in the primary sales market. In this equilibrium 
EXPERIMENTS
Given four different designs of the secondary exchange market, we have specified conditions that support pooling or separating equilibrium in the primary market. Thus, our theory offers important predictions on agent behavior and market outcomes given the design of the secondary market. We choose to test the theory and, furthermore, to compare the benefits of tiered structure under RF versus DF using controlled laboratory experiments and incentivized human subjects. In this setting we manipulate participants' preferences, observe their strategic behavior and measure the effect of market design on individual choices, firm profit, and overall market outcomes.
Specifically, we explore: (1) how our theory performs in predicting agents' behavior and market outcomes in tiered versus tier-free market structures; (2) how human subjects adapt to a change of market structure (e.g., Kagel 
2009).
Although the benchmark theory assumes risk neutrality, we incorporate risk attitudes into the empirical investigation. Many strategic decisions are made under uncertainty. For example, in the tier-free structure Premium households typically face the tradeoff between a guaranteed high utility (if they purchase Q H ) and a higher-risk, higher-return gamble (if they purchase Q L and then attempt to trade up).
Hence, we expect individuals' risk attitude to influence their behavior. We also allow participants to participate in repeated markets so they can obtain feedback and adjust their strategy. Over time, we expect their behavior to converge towards the theoretically predicted market equilibrium. Repeated markets also allow us to gather sufficient data from a manageable number of experimental sessions.
Experimental Manipulations
Participants of the experiments were recruited from a paid subject pool in a Southwestern university. Each session consisted of six participants. A total number of 96 people participated in 16 experimental sessions. The experiment lasted about 75 minutes and the payment was between $11 and $28, with an average of $18.50 (including a $7 participation fee).
The experiment had a 2 × 2 design: RF vs. DF (between-subject) × tier-free vs. tiered structure (within-subject). The two mechanisms (RF or DF) had a between-subject design, such that for any session we implemented only one of the two exchange mechanism. There were 8 sessions for RF and 8 sessions for DF. We broke each session into two disjoint sets of 15 consecutive markets, with one set testing the tier-free structure and the other testing the tiered structure. Thus each session involved 30 markets in total, starting with one of the tier structures for markets 1 -15, and then shifting (with the same group of participants) to the other structure for markets 16 -30. The within-subject nature allows us to observe how participants adapt to a change in tier structure. 8 We varied the order of the tier structures across sessions to check for any potential order effect. The experimental design is summarized in Table 3 .
_________________________
Insert Table 3 about here _________________________
Experimental Procedure
In each session, six participants were seated in front of computer terminals networked through a zTree client-server program (Fischbacher 2007) . Participants were informed that each individual would receive a $7 participation fee, and they would also earn tokens from 30 markets. The amount of tokens they could expect to accumulate would depend on the decisions they and others in the market made. The tokens were converted to monetary payment at the end of the experiment. In any market, there were always three Premium households and three Value households. A participant's role stayed fixed within a market but was rotated at the beginning of a new market. The rotation in role assignment serves to increase the number of observations in each role while balancing out participants' compensation.
Participants learned about the exchange mechanism (RF or DF) for that particular session as well as the tier structure (tiered or tier-free) for markets 1 -15. They were allowed to go through two trial markets to gain familiarity with the interface. Performance in the trial markets did not affect participants' payment. Any question a participant raised at this point was publicly repeated and answered. Then the first set of markets (1 -15) was run. Upon finishing market 15, the participants were notified of the change in tier structure and then went through markets 16 -30. 8 Similar experimental designs have been adopted by Kagel and Roth (2000) and McKinney, Niederle and Roth (2005) .
In each market, in line with the setup of our model, every participant made one purchase decision in the primary market and one entry decision in the secondary market. (See Appendix B for details.) At the end of each market, participants learned from their computer screen how much profit they made and how many tokens they had accumulated so far.
After participating in the 30 markets, participants made a sequence of paired lottery-choice decisions between what we call "lottery A" and "lottery B". This is a procedure designed to elicit an individual's risk attitude (Holt and Laury 2002) . Table 4 illustrates the payoff table presented to participants. In this table, a participant chose lottery A or lottery B in each row and one row was later selected at random for payout for that participant. As lottery B involves more extreme payoffs, it is more risky than lottery A. Thus in each choice (except for choice 1 which involves no uncertainty and serves as a test for participants' understanding of the instructions), there is a tradeoff between expected (maximum) payoff and the risk involved. The expected payoff from lottery A becomes greater than the expected payoff from lottery B as one proceeds down the table. Most participants would be expected to switch from B to A on some row in the table, and this switching point can then be used to infer their risk attitude.
The logic behind this test is that only risk-loving participants would choose lottery B in the bottom rows, and only risk-averse participants would choose lottery A in the top rows. A risk neutral participant would switch from choosing B to choosing A when the expected payoffs are about the same, i.e., she would choose B for the first six rows and A thereafter.
__________________________
Insert Table 4 about here __________________________ Finally, participants filled out a short check-out form, received their cash payment, were thanked and left the computer lab. Appendix C provides detailed experimental instructions for RF sessions starting with the tier-free structure. The other three sets of instructions were similar.
Parameter Values and Theoretical Predictions
We use the same parameter values in all four experimental conditions, because any difference we observe across conditions in agents' behavior and market outcomes can then be attributed to the design of the market. We selected a single set of parameter values that supports all market equilibria predicted by Propositions 1 -4. To do this, we used the equations that characterize the equilibrium outcomes to compute cutoff points, probability of entry, and added values from exchange to ensure that all conditions in the four propositions are met simultaneously. We summarize all parameter values in Table 5 .
__________________________
Insert Table 5 about here __________________________ Note that we have a strong test of the theory as n H is set to 1 (i.e., initially there is only one high quality property in the space bank). If more high quality properties were available in the space bank, the likelihood of upgrading from Q L to Q H would increase in tier-free structures and it would become obvious that the Premium households prefer to pool with Value households on purchasing Q L . Comparatively, with n H = 1, the benefit of pooling on Q L for the Premium households is subtle.
Given the parameters in Table 5, households' optimal purchasing strategy would be determined by the tier structure.
The tier-free RF markets support the pooling equilibrium proposed in Proposition 1, and we expect unraveling over time to no purchase of high quality properties by Premium households. That is, all six households should purchase Q L . Moreover, all households should enter the exchange market to try to upgrade. We expect a first exchange from Q L to Q H , followed by an average of 3.75 exchanges from original Q L to better Q L . Overall, 79.17% of the participants should make successful exchanges.
The tiered RF markets support the separating equilibrium proposed in Proposition 2, so we expect the three Premium households to purchase Q H and the three Value households to purchase Q L . Assuming that three households end up in the low (high) quality tier, 88.89% (92.31%) are expected to enter the exchange and 66.67% (50.00%) should make successful withdrawals.
In tier-free DF markets, in line with Proposition 3, we expect unraveling over time to no purchase of high quality properties by the Premium households. That is, 100% of the participants are expected purchase Q L and then enter the exchange market.
In tiered DF markets, in line with Proposition 4, we expect the two quality tiers to function separately. The three Premium (Value) households are expected to purchase Q H (Q L ). The Premium (Value) households should make deposits when the state-dependent component of their property value is below the cutoff point, 1.77 (2.29). Thus 72.10% (78.59%) of the Premium (Value) households are expected to enter the high (low) quality tier of the exchange market. Table 5 provides a summary of all parameter values and theoretical predictions.
Experimental Results
Across all four market conditions, we have 2880 observations. We divide data into three blocks.
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Block 1 consists of observations from the first five markets (markets 1 -5 and 16 -20) . Block 2 consists 9 The three blocks have slightly different numbers of observations. This is because the main focus of our analysis is on the last block where individual decision-making and market outcomes have stabilized. We code the last 6 (instead of 5) markets as block three so that each of the 96 participants contributed the same number of observations as a Premium or a Value household.
of the four markets in the middle (markets 6 -9 and 21 -24). Block 3 consists of observations from the last six markets (markets 10 -15 and 25 -30).
For each observation, we know the participant's household type, Value or Premium, her purchase decision, her entry decision in the exchange market, and the payoff earned in the market. The main dependent variables are agents' observed actions. A participant's observed action can be described as one Thus in Figure 1 (RF markets) and Figure 2 (DF markets) we present the percentages of households who exhibited each type of these observed actions. Note that we break up observations into the three blocks we described before to illustrate whether and how participants were learning to adapt to the market.
______________________________
Insert Figures 1 & 2 about here ______________________________
Theoretically optimal actions (assuming risk neutrality) are highlighted with circles along the horizontal axis in Figures 1 and 2 . 10 In theory, all households are expected to game the system in a tierfree structure by purchasing Q L and entering the exchange market for an upgrade; in a tiered structure, Premium (Value) households should purchase Q H (Q L ) and the majority of households should enter the exchange market. 11 We can see in the figures that Value households' actual behavior was quite consistent with these predictions. However, in a tier-free structure Premium households attempted to game the system much less frequently than predicted. In a tiered structure Premium households also entered markets less frequently than predicted, especially in markets operating under the DF mechanism.
In what follows, we first describe how agents learned over time. Then we compare observed behavior with theoretical predictions and explore how risk attitude affects choices. 12 Finally, we compare market level performance (e.g., firm revenue and consumer surplus) of RF versus DF mechanisms.
Learning
Across all conditions, participants made relatively few choices that lead to losses. For example, participants in the role of Value households purchased Q H only 7.6% of the time. Moreover, such costly mistakes declined over time. For example, for Premium households in the tier-free DF markets, the action "Buy Q H & Enter" results in an average loss of 33 tokens. For these participants a logistic regression with "Buy Q H & Enter" as the dependent variable and block as the independent variable shows a lower 10 A circle with double solid lines indicates that, in theory, 100% of households should choose the action. A circle with a single solid line indicates this is the best action for the majority of households, whereas a circle with dashed line is used for the best action for a small percentage of households. Please refer to theoretical predictions in Table 3 for details. 11 In tiered RF, one should stay out when she is endowed with the maximum value in her tier. In tiered DF, one should stay out when her state-dependent component s is above the cutoff value in her tier. Table 3 provides percentage predictions. 12 As each individual participant made multiple decisions, in all data analyses we cluster standard errors at the participant level.
likelihood of choosing this action in later blocks (z = -3.11, p < .01). We run similar regressions for all four actions for each condition. Statistically significant findings are indicated in Figures 1 and 2 . Overall, the pattern confirms that participants understand the market and learn gradually to avoid costly mistakes.
We also find that participants choose optimal strategies more frequently as they gain more experience. For example for Premium households in the tier-free RF mechanism, a logistic regression with "Buy Q L & Enter" as the dependent variable and block as independent variable shows that participants are more likely to this optimal strategy in later blocks (z = 3.80, p < .01).
Learning is also present when we check for order effects. In general, participants who begin with a tier-free structure are likely to make more mistakes in tier-free structure (i.e., the first set of markets for them) than those who begin with a tiered structure, and vice versa. For instance, for Value households across all four conditions, an analysis of variance with purchase decision as the dependent variable and tier structure, order and their interaction as independent variables reveals that the interaction term has a significant effect in block 1 (F = 7.48, p < .01). This is because 15.83% (5.83%) of the Value households who begin with a tier-free (tiered) structure purchase Q H in the tier-free structure, whereas 9.17% (15%) of them make the same costly mistake in the tiered structure. However, this interaction is not found in block 2 or block 3 (p > .10), suggesting that the order effect diminishes over time.
These analyses consistently show that participants exhibit reasonable understanding and learning in all markets. Over time they make fewer mistakes and are more likely to behave optimally.
Comparison between Observed Behavior and Theory
Next, we focus on data from block 3 (last 6 markets) where participants' behavior has stabilized.
In Table 6 we compare observed behavior with theoretical predictions.
________________________________
Insert Table 6 about here _________________________ As residual order effect may be present, we control for it in all analysis that follows. Consistent with theory, on average only 5.38% of Value households purchase Q H (although 5.38% > 0, p < .05), and the probabilities of making this mistake are not statistically different across four market conditions.
Conditional on purchasing Q L , we have the following findings about Value households.
First, entry decisions by Value households are consistent with theory (i.e., 100% entry) in three of the four market conditions. The only exception is the tier-free DF market, where the percentage of Value households entering the exchange market is significantly lower than predicted (91.18% < 100%, p < .05).
This could be due to the fact that this market involves substantial risk, thus deterring entry even for the Value households. A logistic regression confirms that the entry decision of Value households in tier-free DF markets is largely driven by the value of one's original property (z = -3.96, p < .001): those endowed with higher values are less likely to enter the exchange market even though there is a slight chance of upgrading to Q H . Risk attitude does not affect entry decision (p > .20) , indicating that across the board Value households avoid exchange in tier-free DF markets if they start with a good value of Q L .
Second, Value households enter exchange more under tier-free RF than tier-free DF (98.54% vs.
91.18%, z = 2.37, p < .05), controlling for all other relevant factors. This is an interesting finding not predicted by theory, implying that with a tier-free market structure, the RF mechanism invites more gaming than the DF mechanism.
Third, consistent with theory, there is clearly more gaming in markets with tier-free structure than those with tiered structure. Logistic regressions reveal that Value households are more likely to enter a tier-free structure than a tiered structure (z = -3.39, p < .001 in RF; z = -4.68, p < .001 in DF), and they are more likely to enter when they start with a lower property value (z = -2.85, p < .01 in RF; z = -4.53, p < .001 in DF). Interestingly, risk attitude affects entry decisions differently in RF vs. DF: risk-averse households are more likely to enter under the RF mechanism (z = -3.52, p < .001), whereas they are less likely to enter under the DF mechanism (z = 4.95, p < .05). This finding is a little surprising but reasonable. The RF mechanism is risk-free, so risk-averse participants game the system even more to make sure they do not miss any opportunity to obtain a higher value. In contrast, DF markets involve risk, so risk-averse participants game the system less than their risk-seeking counterparts.
Overall, Value households' behavior is quite consistent with theoretical predictions: although the tier structure does not affect their purchase decision, it has a significant effect on entry decisions so that households game the system to a greater extent in a tier-free structure than in a tiered structure.
Compared to the Value households, the Premium households' behavior deviates more from the theory. First, in the tier-free structure, Premium households game the system significantly less than predicted (62.50% in tier-free RF; 45.14% in tier-free DF; theoretical prediction is 100% for both). A major reason is that, unlike Value households whose dominating strategy is straightforward, Premium households expect a slightly higher payoff from purchasing Q H than from purchasing Q L if they do not consider the potential upgrade in the tier-free exchange market. So, risk-averse Premium households may play it safe by purchasing Q H and staying out of the exchange market. A logistic regression confirms that risk-averse participants indeed game marginally less than risk-seeking ones (z = 1.78, p < .10). Moreover, consistent with what we find among Value households, Premium households game more in tier-free RF markets (62.50%) than in tier-free DF markets (45.14%) and the difference is marginally significant (z = 1.69, p < .10), implying that the tier-free RF mechanism is more likely to invite attempts to game the system. Among those who purchase Q H , 71.14% enter the exchange under tier-free RF versus 4.10% under tier-free DF, suggesting that the tier-free DF market is risky for high quality property owners so that they cannot participate or benefit from it. This is consistent with our theoretical analysis. Second, in the tiered structure most Premium households purchase Q H (as theory predicts), but they enter the exchange market significantly less than predicted (75.61% < 92.31%, p < .05 in tiered RF; 44.88% < 72.10%, p < .05 in tiered DF). Conditional on purchasing Q H , logistic regression models reveal that Premium households are more likely to enter exchange when their original property value is lower (z = -4.07, p < .01 in tiered RF; z = -3.98, p < .01 in tiered DF). Risk attitude again affects entry decisions in a complex manner: comparing to risk-seeking participants, risk-averse participants are more likely to enter exchange under tiered RF (z = -2.18, p < .05), while they are less likely to enter exchange under tiered DF (z = 2.36, p < .05). This is consistent with findings among Value households.
Third, Premium households' purchase decisions are significantly different in tiered vs. tier-free structures (z = 5.61, p < .01 in RF; z = 4.32, p < .01 in DF), suggesting that the tiered structure does help to restore primary sales in the Premium segment of the market. Indeed, Premium households shift away from "Buy Q L & Enter" in tiered structure because they cannot game the system any more. This finding renders strong support for our theory.
Comparison between RF and DF at the Market Level
Although we expected 100% gaming for all households in a tier-free structure, the observed behavior deviates from this prediction, especially for the Premium households. Findings from both consumer segments indicate that gaming in a tier-free structure is more likely to occur under RF as compared to DF, presumably because the risk involved in DF can discourage households from attempting to game the system. Thus, it is critical to compare the market-level performance of RF and DF, and to explicitly measure the benefit of introducing tiered structure under both mechanisms.
We use data from block 3 (last 6 markets) to compare different market designs using performance measures at the market level. In particular, we compare total consumer surplus (sum of earnings for all 6 participants in a market), firm revenue (sum of price paid by all 6 participants in a market), total social surplus (sum of firm revenue, total consumer surplus and the remaining value of space bank properties 13 ), number of entries and number of successful exchanges. The summaries are in Table 7 .
_________________________
Insert Table 7 about here _________________________ From Table 7 , we see that total consumer surplus is significantly higher in a tier-free structure (as they pay less there) under both DF (p < .01) and RF (p < .01). On the flip side, firm revenue is significantly higher under both DF (p < .01) and RF (p < .01) in a tiered structure, as gaming is curbed and primary sales are restored. Note that tier-free RF performs the worst among all four designs in terms 13 After exchanges are fulfilled, the firm can redeem the market value of remaining properties (such as through rental). of firm revenue (p < .05). Combining these effects, total social surplus is shown to be significantly higher in a tiered structure than in a tier-free structure for both DF (p < .01) and RF (p < .01), and lowest under tier-free RF (p < .05). These findings about firm revenue and total social surplus are direct results of the highest level of gaming we observe in tier-free RF markets at the individual level.
Although across the board we observe fewer entries and successful exchanges than theoretically predicted, the overall pattern supports the theory quite well: There are more entries into the exchange market under RF than under DF (p < .01 in the comparison of DF to RF, in either tiered or tier-free structure), and more entries in tier-free than in tiered structure (p < .05 under both DF and RF). There are also slightly more successful exchanges in tier-free than in tiered structure. However, there is still a significant amount of successful exchanges markets with tiered structure, suggesting that the restoration of primary sales is achieved without adversely affecting exchanges to a great extent.
CONCLUSIONS
Our theory proposes that when secondary markets offer upgrade opportunities, consumers' incentive to purchase high quality properties at their market clearing price will diminish. To preempt this problem, firms can adopt a tiered approach in the secondary market. By restricting upgrading, the firm can simultaneously separate different types of consumers in the primary market and facilitate exchanges among all owners in the secondary market. Thus, the tiered structure can potentially boost firm revenues while allowing for sufficient exchanges.
We investigate how well the theory predicts individual behavior and market outcome using a series of controlled laboratory markets. We find some deviation from theory, especially in the Premium (or less price-sensitive) segment. However, in general, participants gradually move towards equilibrium predictions as they gain more experience with the market. Furthermore, observed deviation can be partly explained by risk aversion.
Our main argument regarding the tier structure is strongly supported by the experimental data.
Under both the Request First and the Deposit First mechanisms, both consumer segments game the system more in a tier-free structure than in a tiered structure. Notably, the purchase decision of the Premium segment is strongly affected by the tier structure as the theory predicts -participants in the Premium segment tend to purchase high quality properties more frequently in a tiered market than in a tier-free market. At the market level, firm revenue and total social welfare are significantly higher in tiered markets than in tier-free markets.
Interestingly, we also find empirical evidence that the benefit of adopting a tiered structure is more substantial under the Request First mechanism than under the Deposit First mechanism. In particular, with a tier-free structure, the incentive compatible Request First mechanism performs significantly worse than the non-incentive-compatible Deposit First mechanism in terms of firm revenue and total social surplus. This is because the Request First mechanism does not involve any risk of downgrading, thus inducing more gaming behavior from all participants.
Our theoretical analysis and experimental investigation offer useful insights for firms in the fractional ownership markets as well as firms considering the introduction of fractional ownership programs into their product portfolios. We believe that firms should be encouraged to develop and operate tiered fractional ownership programs. In this work, we compared a single market to a two-tiered market.
However, with more heterogeneous quality levels, managers may introduce more tiers to discourage upgrading activities that might hurt primary sales. Our results also suggest that when a tiered structure cannot be feasibly implemented, the Deposit First mechanism outperforms the Request First mechanism, as the former discourages risk-averse participants from gaming the system and the latter does not.
Overall, managers should be made aware of the importance of market design in the secondary market and how it affects outcomes in both primary and secondary markets. With a carefully designed market, firms can encourage purchase as well as exchange, boosting the profitability of their fractional ownership programs.
This research can be extended in many ways. First, there are other exchange mechanisms being utilized in the fractional ownership market that could be investigated. For example, some exchange markets are based on a "point" system, or a combination of one-to-one exchange with points as a side transfer. Second, one could further explore the optimal amount of resources a firm should make available in the space bank, incorporating an explicit holding cost (or opportunity cost) for each unit of property in the space bank. Finally, we assume in this study that the two quality levels for properties are sufficiently far apart so that all consumers always prefer a high quality property over a low quality property.
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** In the tiered DF markets, households in each quality tier should enter the exchange market when their endowed value is below a cutoff point, and should stay out of the exchange market otherwise. The percentages of entry are calculated accordingly. Note 1: Tests are at the session aggregate level for the last six markets (block 3). The number of observations is 8 in every cell. Tests are paired (within-subject) for tier-free vs. tiered structure within an exchange mechanism (DF or RF). Tests are two-sample (between-subjects) for DF vs. RF under a given tier structure because each participant experienced either DF or RF, but not both.
Note 2: Bold numbers indicate significant differences. 
